

COMPUTATIONAL SEMANTICS: DAY 2

Johan Bos


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Computational Semantics


- Day 1: Exploring Models
- **Day 2: Meaning Representations**
- Day 3: Computing Meanings
- Day 4: Drawing Inferences
- Day 5: Meaning Banking



Questions after yesterday's lecture

- Inferring from observations (“flying bird”)
- (Too?) detailed lexical semantics for verbs
- Small (?) dataset of image models in GRIM
- Adding probabilities
- What are the “zero-place” symbols?

The Big Picture



Constructing basic formulas

- Suppose we're given a model **M** and want to check whether this model satisfies certain descriptions
- For instance, perhaps we want to check whether there is a *cat* present



Constructing basic formulas

- Suppose we're given a model \mathbf{M} and want to check whether this model satisfies certain descriptions
- For instance, perhaps we want to check whether there is a *cat* present
- We could construct a formula by applying the one-place non-logical symbol CAT to a variable, say x :



$CAT(x)$

Constructing basic formulas

- Suppose we're given a model **M** and want to check whether this model satisfies certain descriptions
- For instance, perhaps we want to check whether there is a *cat* present
- We could construct a formula by applying the one-place non-logical symbol *CAT* to a variable, say *x*:



$CAT(x)$

- We can now check whether **M** satisfies this formula, but we need the help of an *assignment function*

Variable assignment function

- An assignment function maps all variables in a formula to an entity in the model's domain
- Usually a lowercase letter g is used to denote an assignment function

Variable assignment function

- An assignment function maps all variables in a formula to an entity in the model's domain
- Usually a lowercase letter g is used to denote an assignment function
- For instance, for two variables x and y and a domain with three entities $d1$, $d2$, and $d3$, the following assignment functions are possible:
 - $g_1(x)=d1, g_1(y)=d1$
 - $g_2(x)=d1, g_2(y)=d2$
 - $g_3(x)=d1, g_3(y)=d3$
 - $g_4(x)=d2, g_4(y)=d1$,
etc.

Satisfaction

- Suppose we have this model:
and assignment: $g(x)=d1$
and this formula: $CAT(x)$

$M=\langle D,F \rangle$

$D=\{d1,d2,d3\}$

$F(CAT)=\{d2\}$

$F(DOG)=\{d1,d3\}$

$F(TOUCHES)=\{(d3,d2)\}$

Does this model satisfy this formula wrt g ?

$M,g \models CAT(x) ?$



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Does this model satisfy this formula wrt g ?

$M,g \models CAT(x) ?$

Only if $g(x)$ is in $F(CAT)$



Logic should not be a lottery

- There is clearly a cat in our model, but the answer we get is *false*...
- We only get *true* if we pick out the right value for x
- But we don't want to rely on luck!



Existential quantification

- Logic has a well-known device to avoid being dependent on luck:


\exists

The existential quantifier is always connected to a variable:

If F is a formula, and x a variable,
then $\exists xF$ is a formula.

Giuseppe Peano

Italian mathematician,
founder of mathematical
logic (1858-1932)



source: en.wikipedia.org

Satisfaction again

- Suppose we have this model:
- And assignment: $g(x)=d1$
- And this formula: $\exists x \text{CAT}(x)$

$M = \langle D, F \rangle$

$D = \{d1, d2, d3\}$

$F(\text{CAT}) = \{d2\}$

$F(\text{DOG}) = \{d1, d3\}$

$F(\text{TOUCHES}) = \{(d3, d2)\}$

Does this model (let's call it M) satisfy this formula wrt g ?

$M, g \models \exists x \text{CAT}(x)$?

Only if $M, g' \models \text{CAT}(x)$, where g' is a copy of g but changes are allowed only with respect to x . E.g.: $g'(x)=d2$

Constructing complex formulas

- Suppose we're given a model **M** and want to check whether this model satisfies multiple descriptions
- For instance, perhaps we want to check whether there is a *cat* present **and** that it is *white*
- We could construct two basic formulas and form a conjunction (using a new symbol \wedge and brackets):

$$[\text{CAT}(x) \wedge \text{WHITE}(x)]$$

- We can now check whether **M** satisfies this formula.

Satisfaction again

- Suppose we have this model M:
- And assignment: $g(x)=d1$
- And this formula: $[CAT(x)\wedge WHITE(x)]$

$M=\langle D,F\rangle$
 $D=\{d1,d2,d3\}$
 $F(CAT)=\{d2\}$
 $F(DOG)=\{d1,d3\}$
 $F(WHITE)=\{d2,d3\}$

Does M satisfy this formula wrt g?

$M,g \models [CAT(x)\wedge WHITE(x)]$?

Only if $M,g \models CAT(x)$ *and* $M,g \models WHITE(x)$

Constructing negated formulas

- Suppose we're given a model **M** and want to check whether this model does not satisfy a certain description
- For instance, perhaps we want to check that there is *no dog* present, or that there are *no sleeping cats* around
- We can do this by introducing a negation: \neg
A negated formula is simply formed by putting \neg in front

$$\neg\text{DOG}(x)$$

A model satisfies a negated formula F iff it doesn't satisfy F
 $M, g \models \neg\text{DOG}(x)$ iff it is not the case that $M, g \models \text{DOG}(x)$

Ingredients of a first-order language


1. All **symbols** in the vocabulary – the non-logical symbols of the first-order language
2. Enough **variables** (a countably infinite collection):
x, y, z, etc.
3. The Boolean **connectives** \neg (negation), \wedge (conjunction), \vee (disjunction), and \rightarrow (implication)
4. The **quantifiers** \forall (the universal quantifier) and \exists (the existential quantifier)
5. Some **punctuation** symbols:
brackets and the comma.



George Boole

English mathematician,
pioneer of modern
mathematical logic
(1815-1864)

source: en.wikipedia.org




First-order terms

- Any constant or any variable is a first-order term
- Constants are sometimes called 0-place predicates
- Terms are the “noun phrases” of first-order languages
 - constants are first-order analogs of proper names
 - variables are first-order analogs of pronouns



Atomic formulas

- If R is a relation symbol of arity n , and t_1, \dots, t_n are terms, then $R(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is an atomic formula
- If t_1 and t_2 are terms, then $t_1 = t_2$ is an atomic formula



Well formed formulas (wffs)

1. All atomic formulas are wffs
2. If φ and ψ are wffs,
then so are $\neg\varphi$, $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$, $(\varphi \vee \psi)$, $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$
3. If φ is a wff, and x is a variable,
then both $\exists x\varphi$ and $\forall x\varphi$ are wffs
4. Nothing else is a wff

Well formed formulas (wffs)

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3. If φ is a wff, and x is a variable,
then both $\exists x\varphi$ and $\forall x\varphi$ are wffs
[φ is the *scope* of the quantifier \exists/\forall]
4. Nothing else is a wff

Free and Bound Variables

- An occurrence of a variable is free in a formula ψ if it is not bound in ψ
- An occurrence of a variable x is bound in a formula ψ if it appears in the scope of a quantifier $\exists x$ or $\forall x$ in ψ



Closed formulas

- Formulas that have no free variables are called *closed*
- Usually we're only interested in closed formulas
- Translating a natural language sentence to first-order logic should produce a closed formula
- Free variables can be thought of as “pronouns”



Logicians are only human

- Logicians (and mathematicians) are usually very precise in their formulations
- However, they sometimes drop punctuation symbols if no confusion arises
- Often outermost brackets are dropped; also other brackets as long as no confusion arises
- Examples:
 - $p \wedge q$ instead of $(p \wedge q)$
 - $p \vee (q \wedge r)$ instead of $(p \vee (q \wedge r))$
 - $(p \vee q \vee r)$ instead of $(p \vee (q \vee r))$

The satisfaction definition for FOL

$M, g \models R(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n)$	<i>iff</i>	$(I_F^g(\tau_1), \dots, I_F^g(\tau_n)) \in F(R),$
$M, g \models \tau_1 = \tau_2$	<i>iff</i>	$I_F^g(\tau_1) = I_F^g(\tau_2),$
$M, g \models \neg\phi$	<i>iff</i>	not $M, g \models \phi,$
$M, g \models (\phi \wedge \psi)$	<i>iff</i>	$M, g \models \phi$ and $M, g \models \psi,$
$M, g \models (\phi \vee \psi)$	<i>iff</i>	$M, g \models \phi$ or $M, g \models \psi,$
$M, g \models (\phi \rightarrow \psi)$	<i>iff</i>	not $M, g \models \phi$ or $M, g \models \psi,$
$M, g \models \exists x\phi$	<i>iff</i>	$M, g' \models \phi,$ for some x -variant g' of $g,$
$M, g \models \forall x\phi$	<i>iff</i>	$M, g' \models \phi,$ for all x -variants g' of $g.$

$I_F^g(\tau)$ is $F(c)$ if the term τ is a constant c , and $g(x)$ if τ is a variable x .

Do we really need all this stuff?

- implication
- disjunction
- quantifiers

A note on notation...

- Negation: \neg or \sim
- Conjunction: \wedge or $\&$
- Implication: \rightarrow or \supset
- Equivalence: \leftrightarrow or \equiv
- Brackets: (\dots) or $[\dots]$



A note on naming...

First-order logic = predicate logic = classical/standard logic

What's wrong with these translations?

English	First-order logic
A dog barks.	$\exists x(\text{dog}(x) \rightarrow \text{bark}(x))$
Vincent likes every dog.	$\forall x(\text{dog}(x) \wedge \text{like}(\text{vincent}, x))$
No dog barks.	$\exists x(\text{dog}(x) \wedge \neg \text{bark}(x))$
Every dog chases a cat.	$\forall x(\text{dog}(x) \rightarrow \exists y(\text{cat}(y) \wedge \text{chase}(y, x))$

What's wrong with these translations?

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No dog barks.	$\neg \exists x(\text{dog}(x) \wedge \text{bark}(x))$
Every dog chases a cat.	$\forall x(\text{dog}(x) \rightarrow \exists y(\text{cat}(y) \wedge \text{chase}(x, y))$

Model Checking

- The task of the determining whether a given model satisfies a formula (or a set of formulas)

Input: model + formula

Output: true or false

Model Checking

$M = \langle D, F \rangle$

$D = \{d1, d2, d3, d4\}$

$F(\text{mia}) = d1$

$F(\text{honey-bunny}) = d2$

$F(\text{vincent}) = d3$

$F(\text{yolanda}) = d4$

$F(\text{customer}) = \{d1, d3\}$

$F(\text{robber}) = \{d2, d4\}$

$F(\text{love}) = \{(d4, d2), (d3, d1)\}$

Q1: Does M satisfy: $\exists x(\text{customer}(x) \wedge \exists y(\text{customer}(y) \wedge \text{love}(x,y)))$

Q2: Does M satisfy: $\exists x(\text{robber}(x) \wedge \text{love}(x,x))$

Model Checking (“amazing” demo)

1. `~/grim % cat scripts/model_checker.pl | more`
2. `scripts/_checkmodels "some(X,n_cat_1(X))"`
3. `scripts/_checkmodels "some(X,n_cat_1(X))" > out.tex`
4. `pdflatex out`

Model Checking (“amazing” demo)

Nice examples (1):

- a cat and dog

- a cat and a dog

- a white cat and a dog

Nice examples (2):

- a bicycle

- a woman and a bicycle

- a woman on a bicycle

Combining Model Extraction & Model Checking

A man threw a bottle in the ocean.

A woman wrote a letter.

Someone dropped two bottles in the sea.

A man with a beard wrote something on a piece of paper.



Combining Model Extraction & Model Checking

A man threw a bottle in the ocean. ✓

A woman wrote a letter. ✗

Someone dropped two bottles in the sea. ✗

A man with a beard wrote something on a piece of paper. ✓






Different kinds of meaning representations

- Expressive power
- FOL, DRS, AMR
- Syntax
- Semantics

What is a good meaning representation?

- All-purpose? Or tailored to specific application?
- Worry about inference efficiency?
- Readability for humans?

Controlling Inference



Syntax of FOL (in Backus-Nauer Form, BNF)

$$F ::= P_n(t_1 \dots t_n) \mid$$
$$\neg F \mid$$
$$(F \wedge F) \mid$$
$$\exists x F$$

Short version

F is a formula of first-order logic

P_n is a n -place non-logical symbol

t is a term (constant or variable)

Syntax of FOL (in Backus-Nauer Form, BNF)

$$F ::= P_n(t_1 \dots t_n) \mid$$
$$\neg F \mid$$
$$(F \wedge F) \mid (F \vee F) \mid (F \rightarrow F) \mid$$
$$\exists x F \mid \forall x F$$

Long version (with disjunction and universal quantifier)

F is a formula of first-order logic

P_n is a n -place non-logical symbol

t is a term (constant or variable)

Syntax of FOL (in Backus-Nauer Form, BNF)

$$F ::= P_n(t_1 \dots t_n) \mid$$
$$\neg F \mid t=t \mid$$
$$(F \wedge F) \mid (F \vee F) \mid (F \rightarrow F) \mid$$
$$\exists x F \mid \forall x F$$

Long version with equality

F is a formula of first-order logic

P_n is a n -place non-logical symbol

t is a term (constant or variable)

Back to yesterday's events...



$\text{kick}(x,y) \iff \text{abut}(t_1,t_2) \ \& \ \text{abut}(t_2,t_3) \ \& \ \text{near}(t_1,x,y) \ \& \ \text{touch}(t_2,x,y) \ \& \ \neg \text{near}(t_3,x,y)$

Pre-Davidsonian

Analysis of an achievement event without explicit entities for events.

Problem: integration of event modifiers.




$\text{kick}(e,x,y) \wedge \text{time}(e,t_2) \Leftrightarrow \text{abut}(t_1,t_2) \ \& \ \text{abut}(t_2,t_3) \ \& \ \text{near}(t_1,x,y) \ \& \ \text{touch}(t_2,x,y) \ \& \ \neg \text{near}(t_3,x,y)$

Davidsonian

Analysis of an achievement event with explicit entities for events.

Advantage: dealing with event modifiers (manner, temporal)

Disadvantage: number of arguments not always consistent



$\text{kick}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e,x) \wedge \text{patient}(e,y) \wedge \text{time}(e,t_2) \Leftrightarrow \text{abut}(t_1,t_2) \ \& \ \text{abut}(t_2,t_3) \ \& \ \text{near}(t_1,x,y) \ \& \ \text{touch}(t_2,x,y) \ \& \ \neg \text{near}(t_3,x,y)$

neo-Davidsonian

Analysis with explicit entities for events and explicit thematic roles.

Advantage: consistent number of argument for event symbols

Disadvantage: need an inventory of thematic roles


$$\text{kick}(e,x,y,z) \wedge \text{time}(e,t_2) \Leftrightarrow \text{abut}(t_1,t_2) \ \& \ \text{abut}(t_2,t_3) \ \& \ \text{near}(t_1,x,y) \ \& \ \text{touch}(t_2,x,y) \ \& \ \neg \text{near}(t_3,x,y)$$

Hobbsian

Analysis of all event with fixed number (4) of arguments.

Advantage: consistent number of arguments

Disadvantage: need dummy variables

Other meaning representations

- First-order formula syntax not always handy
- Readability (brackets...)
- Dealing with pronouns in texts (rather than sentences)
- Donkey sentences (where the article “a” seems to introduce a universal rather than an existential quantifier)

- This led in the early 1980s to the development of “dynamic” semantic theories such as DRT

Syntax of DRS (in Backus-Nauer Form, BNF)

$B ::= [x_1 \dots x_n \mid C_1 \dots C_m]$

$C ::= \neg B \mid$

$B \vee B \mid$

$B \Rightarrow B \mid$

$P_n(x_1, \dots, x_n)$

B is a DRS (Discourse Representation Structure)

C is a DRS-condition

P_n is a n-place predicate symbol


x is discourse referent (variable)

Comparing FOL with DRS syntax

Every student kicked a lecturer.

FOL: $\forall x(\text{student}(x) \rightarrow \exists y(\text{lecturer}(y) \wedge \text{kick}(x,y)))$

DRS: $[\mid [x \mid \text{student}(x)] \Rightarrow [y \mid \text{lecturer}(y), \text{kick}(x,y)]]$



Interpretation of DRS

- But wait a minute?

We don't have a satisfaction definition for DRSs!

- Two possibilities:

- Translate DRS into FOL
- Give a satisfaction definition for DRS

- Both are possible

(see Kamp & Reyle, Muskens, and many others)

Butch stole a chopper.
It was parked in a garage.

no events

x y u v
Butch(x) chopper(y) stole(x,y) u=y garage(v) parked-in(u,v)



Davidsonian

x y e u v e'
Butch(x) chopper(y) stole(e,x,y) u=y garage(v) parked(e',u) in(e',v)



Hobbsian

x y e u v e' a b c d
Butch(x) chopper(y) stole(e,x,a,b) agent(e,x) u=y garage(v) parked(e',u,c,d) in(e',v)



neo-Davidsonian

x y e u v e'
Butch(x) chopper(y) stole(e) agent(e,x) theme(e,y) u=y garage(v) parked(e') theme(e',u) location(e',v)

Abstract Meaning Representations

- Simple meaning representations without explicit scope and quantifiers
- Relatively easy to edit by human beings

Syntax of AMR (in Backus-Naur Form, BNF)

$$A ::= c \mid$$
$$x \mid$$
$$(x / P_1) \mid$$
$$(x/P_1 :P_2A \dots :P_2A)$$

A is an AMR (Abstract Meaning Representation)

P_n is a n-place predicate symbol

x is a variable

c is a constant

“Johan wants money.” AMR

```
( e / want  
  :ARGO ( x / johan )  
  :ARG1 ( y / money ) )
```

Comparing AMR to DRS

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x	y	e
johan(x)		
money(y)		
want(e)		
Agent(e,x)		
Theme(e,y)		

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x	y	e
want(e)		
johan(x)		
money(y)		
Agent(e,x)		
Theme(e,y)		

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x	y	e
		want(e)
		money(y)
		Agent(e,x)
		johan(x)
		Theme(e,y)

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x	y	e
		want(e)
		Agent(e,x)
		johan(x)
		Theme(e,y)
		money(y)

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x y e
want(e) Agent(e,x) johan(x) Theme(e,y) money(y)

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x y e
want(e) :ARG0(e,x) johan(x) :ARG1(e,y) money(y)

“Johan wants money.” DRS

x y e
(e / want :ARG0(e,x) (x / johan) :ARG1(e,y) (y / money))

“Johan wants money.”

```
(e / want  
  :ARG0(e,x)  
    (x / johan)  
  :ARG1(e,y)  
    (y / money))
```

“Johan wants money.” AMR

(e / want :ARG0 (x / johan) :ARG1 (y / money))

“Johan wants money.” AMR

```
( e / want
  :ARGO ( x / johan )
  :ARG1 ( y / money ) )
```

JOHAN wants money.

```
( x / johan  
  :ARGO-of ( e / want  
             :ARG1 (y / money) ) )
```

Johan wants MONEY.

```
( y / money
  :ARG1-of ( e / want
             :ARG0 ( x / johan) ) )
```

Every student kicked a lecturer

```
(x / student :polarity -  
  :ARG0-of (e / kick :polarity -  
            :ARG1 (y / lecturer)))
```


An observation about AMR

AMRs without recurring variables are part of the 2-variable fragment of First-Order Logic



It was a picture of a boa constrictor in the act of swallowing an animal.

```
(p / picture
  :domain (i / it)
  :topic (b2 / boa
          :mod (c2 / constrictor)
          :ARG0-of (s / swallow-01
                   :ARG1 (a /
animal) ) ) )
```

```
∃x(picture(x) &
  ∃y(it(y) & domain(x,y)) &
  ∃y(boa(y) & topic(x,y) &
    ∃x(constrictor(x) & mod(y,x)) &
    ∃x(swallow-01(x) & ARG0(x,y) &
      ∃y(animal(y) & ARG1(x,y))))))
```

Proper names

“Mia is happy.”

happy(mia)

Proper names

“Mia is happy.”

happy(mia)

$\exists x(x=mia \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

Proper names

“Mia is happy.”

happy(mia)

$\exists x(x=\text{mia} \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

$\exists x(\text{person}(x) \wedge \text{named}(x,\text{mia}) \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

Proper names

“Mia is happy.”

happy(mia)

$\exists x(x=\text{mia} \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

$\exists x(\text{person}(x) \wedge \text{named}(x,\text{mia}) \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

$\exists x\exists y(\text{person}(x) \wedge \text{has}(x,y) \wedge \text{name}(y) \wedge y=\text{mia} \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

Proper names

“Mia is happy.”

happy(mia)

$\exists x(x=\text{mia} \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

$\exists x(\text{person}(x) \wedge \text{named}(x,\text{mia}) \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

$\exists x\exists y(\text{person}(x) \wedge \text{has}(x,y) \wedge \text{name}(y) \wedge y=\text{mia} \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

$\exists x(\text{mia}(x) \wedge \text{happy}(x))$

FOL, DRS, AMR

- All first-order representations of meaning
- But with different properties
 - Logical aspects (negation, quantification)
 - Human readability
 - Information structure

The Big Picture

