### **Anankastic Conditionals**

Deontic modality: linguistic and logical perspectives on oughts and ends

Cleo Condoravdi Leon van der Torre

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  - b. If Jones wants to eat fastfood for dinner, then he should not go to McDonalds.
  - c. If Jones wants to eat fastfood for dinner, then he should go to McDonalds.
  - d. Jones wants to eat fastfood for dinner.

(2) a. Jones should not smoke.

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  - b. If Jones wants to smoke, then he should not buy cigarettes.
  - c. If Jones wants to smoke, then he should buy cigarettes.

- (2) a. Jones should not smoke.
  - o. If Jones wants to smoke, then he should not buy cigarettes.
  - c. If Jones wants to smoke, then he should buy cigarettes.
  - Jones wants to smoke.

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- ► The two conditionals in the set have identical antecedents and seemingly contradictory consequents but are consistent.
- ▶ A deontic modal, broadly construed, is necessary for the consistency of the conditionals.
- Compare with predictive, epistemic, and counterfactual modals, where the corresponding pairs are inconsistent.

# Inconsistent pairs of conditionals

#### Predictive:

- (3) a. If Jones wants to eat fastfood for dinner, then he will go to McDonalds.
  - b. If Jones wants to eat fastfood for dinner, then he will not go to McDonalds.

## Inconsistent pairs of conditionals

#### Epistemic:

- (4) a. If Jones wanted to eat fastfood for dinner, then he must have gone to McDonalds.
  - b. If Jones wants to eat fastfood for dinner, then he must have not gone to McDonalds.

## Inconsistent pairs of conditionals

#### Counterfactual:

- (5) a. If Jones had wanted to eat fastfood for dinner, then he would have gone to McDonalds.
  - o. If Jones had wanted to eat fastfood for dinner, then he would not have gone to McDonalds.

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- ► The conditional in (c) conveys a best-means-of relation between *p* and *q*.
- Anankastic conditionals (ACs): conditionals of the form If want p, should q that convey a best-means-of relation between p and q.

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- ▶ Is the difference in interpretation between the conditionals in (b) and (c) a difference in the underlying semantics?
- ▶ The conditional in (b) also conveys a best-means-of relation, but one between  $\neg p$  and q.
- From this perspective then, both conditional necessities are instrumental necessities.
- Arguably, all the necessities in the set, including the one in the unconditional premise, are instrumental necessities, but different considerations are at play in their interpretation.

### Dilemma

- ► The new set also presents a dilemma in terms of its potential conclusions.
- Is the dilemma true?
- (6) a. Jones should not to go to McDonalds.
  - b. Jones should go to McDonalds.
- (7) a. Jones should not buy cigarettes.
  - b. Jones should buy cigarettes.

### Factual detachment

- (8) a. If a wants p, a should q.
  - b. a wants p.
  - c. a should q.
  - Is factual detachment with instrumental necessities generally valid?
  - If not, when does the inference go through?
  - Should factual detachment be (in)valid for anankastic conditionals?

### Factual detachment and anankastic conditionals

- (9) a. If you want to go to Harlem, you should take the A train.
  - b. You want to go to Harlem.
  - c. You should take the A train.
  - (9) seems compelling.
  - Factual detachment for ACs has had a long series of detractors in the philosophical literature, who seek analyses of the conditional that would fail to validate factual detachment.
  - ▶ One major argument against it is the variability in the intuitive acceptability of the pattern across instantiations of *q* and *p*.

# Deontic logic for practical reasoning

- Deontic logic was developed in a narrow setting as a logic of obligations.
- In this course we want to consider
  - how it can be used for means-end reasoning
  - also taking linguistic considerations into account.
- We will consider side by side the linguistic semantics and corresponding logical analyses of the sentences in the new type of set.